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Abstract 
Multinational groups have used instruments like intra-debt financing and transfer-mispricing 
to shift their profits by locating their subsidiaries in countries with lower corporate income 
tax rates. Many countries have introduced stricter legislation to reduce BEPS. The purpose 
of this investigation is to study whether stricter rules regarding transfer-pricing and interests’ 
deductibility have been successful in battling international profit shifting. In order to develop 
our research, we use a sample of 21 018 foreign subsidiaries located in EU-28 and in 
Switzerland for the period 2008-2016. We then conduct a panel-data analysis with control 
for both cross-section and time fixed-effects. Our estimated results show that firms reallocate 
income in function of tax rate differences and that the implemented legislation led to a 
reduction of international income shifting. We also show that firms with higher shares of 
intangible assets can escape easier to tighter transfer-pricing rules. We contribute to a scarce 
but growing literature on a matter of great interest for international tax experts. 
Keywords: Corporate Taxation; Profit shifting; BEPS; Transfer-Pricing; Thin-capitalization; 
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Resumo 
As empresas multinacionais fazem uso de diversos instrumentos, designadamente através 
de empréstimos entre subsidiárias do mesmo grupo ou da manipulação preços de 
transferência, para transferir os seus lucros para países com taxas de tributação mais baixas, 
entre outros benefícios. Muitos países introduziram legislação mais rigorosa de maneira a 
reduzir a erosão da base tributável e transferência de rendimentos. O objetivo desta 
investigação passa por verificar se a implementação de regras mais apertadas relativamente, 
quer aos preços de transferência, quer às regras de subcapitalização resultou, de facto, 
numa diminuição da transferência de lucros internacional. Para tal, recorreu-se a uma 
amostra constituída por 21 018 subsidiárias localizadas na EU-28 e na Suíça para o período 
2008-2016. Foi então conduzida uma análise de dados em painel com controlo de efeitos 
fixos temporais e seccionais. Os resultados estimados mostram que as empresas alocam os 
lucros em função das diferenças de taxas de imposto e que o fortalecimento e 
implementação de nova legislação levou a uma redução da transferência de rendimentos 
transfronteiriça. Ficou também provado que empresas com maior peso de ativos 
intangíveis conseguem escapar melhor a regras mais apertadas relativamente aos preços de 
transferência. Contribuímos, assim, para uma literatura escassa, mas crescente numa 
matéria de grande interesse a nível de fiscalidade internacional. 
 
Palavras-chave:  Tributação das Empresas; Transferência de Lucros; Transferência de 
Rendimentos e Erosão da Base Tributável; Preços de Transferência; Regras de 
Subcapitalização
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1. Introduction 
The integration of national economies and markets has expanded substantially in 
recent years. Globalisation meant a growing weight of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in 
global production. These organizations typically explore weaknesses and loopholes in the 
current rules that generate tax savings, which gives opportunities for base erosion and profit 
shifting activities - BEPS. Many MNEs are now paying small percentages of taxes in 
proportion of generated cash-flow streams, motivating some countries to redefine its tax 
policies in order to guarantee more fairness and equity among taxpayers, either as citizens 
and as corporations. Habu (2017) found that in the UK, for the period between 2000 and 
2011, taxable profits relative to total assets reported by foreign multinational subsidiaries are 
12.8 percentage points lower than those of comparable domestic standalone companies. 
Similarly, Huizinga & Laeven (2008) estimated the ratio of profit shifting to the tax base to 
be 13.6% in Germany and about 4.8% in Portugal. 
Home countries acknowledge they may be losing from profit shifting activities both 
under an economic perspective and under a fiscal view. They can suffer due to factors 
dislocation, with MNCs deciding to increase investments on their subsidiaries, neglecting the 
operations in the home-country, leading to the potential loss of economic opportunities if 
foreign countries offer corporations better conditions for investment. Johansson et al. (2017) 
estimated that net tax revenue loss from international tax planning ranged from 4-10 percent 
of corporate income tax revenues, corresponding to a global loss of about USD 0.9-2.1 
trillion from 2005 to 2014. Large MNEs used international tax planning to lower their 
effective tax rate by 4-81/2 percentage points while smaller MNEs reduced tax rates by 11/2-
31/2 percentage points during this same period.2  
Our goal is to tell if BEPS activities have been reduced thanks to the implementation 
of both stricter transfer-pricing and thin-capitalization legislation in EU-28 and in 
Switzerland. First, we intend to show lower corporate tax rates result in higher reported 
results. We then construct the variables regarding either transfer-pricing and thin-
capitalization legislation so we can show whether or not the implemented stricter rules on 
                                                          
2 In the World Investment Report 2015, UNCTAD estimates the revenue losses for developing countries due 
to BEPS range from USD 66 billion to USD 122 billion in 2012. 
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some countries resulted in lower reported results by foreign subsidiaries. We also aim to 
show that firms with higher shares of intangible assets recorded in their accounts tend to 
escape easier to the stricter rules implemented in order to battle for BEPS than firms with 
lower proportions of intangible assets. 
The need to enforce taxation on multinationals is part of OECD’s plans, after 
presenting many studies that presented the problems derived from BEPS activities engaged 
by Multinational firms. Base Erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance 
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules, to artificially shift profits to low or 
no-tax locations. OECD presented an “Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting”, 
which contained some directives and suggestions regarding the fight on profit shifting 
channels. Most Administrations have been following this plan, so they can tackle the 
mechanisms mentioned above. The European Commission has recently published the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive3. This directive contains legally-binding anti-abuse measures. It 
creates a minimum level of protection against corporate tax avoidance throughout the EU, 
while ensuring a fairer and more stable environment for internal market. Some member states 
felt harmed not only by outside countries but also by fellow member states so we hope our 
data sample, comprising European countries relative to a fresh period, can prove some 
effectiveness on policies implemented by governments.  
Opportunities to shift profits abroad arise from some loopholes on tax legislation 
that companies detect and use them to engage in tax savings and guarantee the report of 
more profitable results of affiliates placed in countries associated with lower corporate taxes. 
MNC can be defined as an enterprise operating in several countries but managed from one 
home country. They typically employ many people worldwide and have the ability to transfer 
the production of some products from one country to another, taking advantage of its 
dimension and from certain conditions that host-countries can offer.  The instruments used 
may vary from transfer pricing manipulations, debt-contracting between affiliates within the 
same group or through deduction of payments royalties due to the use of patents on 
intangible property (IP). Although both manipulations can be played simultaneously, 
                                                          
3See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 “Laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market”. Available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1164/oj 
[Accessed on January 2019]. 
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Saunders-Scott (2015) provides evidence that the channels of income shifting, transfer 
pricing and internal financing, are substitutes of each other. 
In fact, more rigid legislation has been put forward to make sure transfer-pricing 
methods obey to the arm’s length principle. Recently efforts on transfer-pricing transparency 
resulted in both increases in the frequency of audit inspections and number of experts at the 
service of tax jurisdictions, document requirements and specific disclosures, as well as the 
possibility of entering into Advanced Price Agreements (APA) or the chance of charged 
penalties in case of failure to comply with norms. Since 2016, many countries made 
obligatory the disclosure of the Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR), where companies 
are required to publicly report taxes paid and profits earned on a country by country basis, 
giving tax administration more concrete information on MNEs affiliates and related-party 
transactions. 
 During our sample period, thin-capitalization regulation has been introduced in the 
form of restrictions on the amount of interests by reference to the ratio of debt to equity. 
For example, the rules might allow interest payments on debt of up to two times4 the total 
amount of equity invested in the group affiliate (2:1), so any additional interest would not be 
deductible. This has resulted in shrinking debt within related parties (Blouin, 2014; Buettner, 
2012). Recently, some countries have reformed existing thin capitalization legislation, 
employing a ratio approach that focuses on the amount of interest paid in relation to the 
amount of income out which that is interest is paid – “Earnings Striping” approach5.  
Additionally, it is believed that corporations with greater intangible property may not 
be subjected to the stricter policies used to combat for BEPS, since profit shifting activities 
are larger in MNEs with high IP and high R&D intensities, according to a research made by 
Grubert, in 2013, about U.S parent corporations and their manufacturing subsidiaries The 
proliferation of the digital economy is also an urge theme for future tax strategies and the 
OECD has also shown interest in developing and reforming tax mechanisms that better fit 
the recent forms of business activities. Such companies benefit from the difficulty on the 
                                                          
4 Portugal allowed for interest deduction up to the amount of debt that corresponded up to two times the 
equity, until 2012. 
5 Germany and Italy, for example, generally cap the deductibility of interest to 30% of EBITDA. 
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location of certain transactions, new payment’s platforms and different ways of creating value 
that emerge with the rise of new technologies and from the collection and monitoring of 
consumer’s data. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) showed the location of intangible assets 
within MNE is, indeed, distorted towards low-tax affiliates. We will conduct additional tests 
in order to test if companies with registered intangible assets have a fewer sensibility to tax-
rate differences and if they respond less to stricter Transfer-pricing rules implemented, 
compared to companies with relatively low or no intangible assets. 
The results of the regressions performed display that stricter transfer-pricing 
legislation are effective in reducing international income-shifting made from Multinational 
groups using a sample constituted by foreign subsidiaries located in European countries for 
the period between 2008 and 2016. We started by showing that firms reallocate income in 
response of tax differences. This response is relatively higher for firms with substantially 
higher shares of intangible assets. 
The main contributions of our study to the existing literature on BEPS are both 
theoretical and empirical. First, our study does both a cross-country and cross-sectional 
analysis on multinationals enterprises located in Europe-28 and in Switzerland, using a more 
recent period once we consider a timeframe between 2008 and 2016. Second, we add to the 
scarce but growing literature on international profit shifting, which is known by its difficulty 
in constructing variables that represent accurately existing rules. Auerbach (2002) and 
Graham (2003) have both claimed about measurement problems they found in their studies 
about effects of tax incentives in capital structures. Third, by analysing Transfer-pricing 
regulations through a dummy variable and Thin-capitalizations rules, according to a 
categorization from Lohse et al. (2012) into three categoric variables, we provide results that 
may help policymakers in understanding the effectiveness of its policies. A fifth contribution 
of our case is related with the additional analysis made to corporations with intangible assets, 
which is a field with a lot of potential for future investigations. Following recent studies made 
by Lohse & Riedel (2013), Buettner et al. (2018) and Marques & Pinho (2016), we will 
conduct a panel-data analysis with control for fixed effects that allows for investigate whether 
tighter rules, that have been implemented in recent years regarding Transfer-pricing and 
interest’s deductibility, have made its impact on combating international income shifting, an 
issue that really concerns governmental organizations. 
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The remaining paper is organized as follows: section 2 examines the background 
literature, section 3 presents the sample selection criteria, the variables definition and 
methodology used. Section 4 reports the empirical results and additional regression analysis. 
Finally, section 6 discusses the concluding remarks of this study, as well as limitations and 
perspectives for future possible researches. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Brief Intro 
Multinational companies locate its subsidiaries in many countries through Foreign 
Direct Investment when they want to get favoured from lower labour costs, capital mobility 
or when they want to enter into new markets. They reallocate income to low-tax affiliates in 
order to shrink their overall tax bill (Devereux, 2007). 
Companies also pay attention to the structure of a country’s tax code, measuring if it 
grants opportunities and benefits for investment and if it is easy for taxpayers to comply 
with. In fact, poorly tax systems can be costly for countries, while distorting economic 
decision-making and harming domestic economy. Some countries have perceived it, 
reforming their tax codes and implementing policies that boosts the state’s competitiveness 
while maintaining neutrality. Nations raise streams of revenue from payroll taxes, VAT, 
individual taxes and from corporate income taxation. When implementing its reforms, 
policymakers aim to attract FDI, which can be achieved with better conditions than other 
countries. Below, we present the International Tax Competitiveness Index for 2016, 
regarding OECD countries, built and then presented by Tax Foundation6: 
Table 1. 2016 International Tax Competitiveness Index from 0 to 100.  
 
Source: The Tax Foundation 
                                                          
6 The Tax Foundation is a U.S leading independent tax policy research organization with countless 
contributions, since 1937. 
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The computed index above looks at countries’ corporate taxes, individual income 
taxes, consumption taxes, property taxes and the treatment of profits earned overseas. Easter 
Europe nations present higher competitiveness indicators, comparing with countries form 
the south or central Europe. This is consistent with the data collected regarding both thin-
capitalization and transfer-pricing rules’ strictness. Those same countries where are 
characterized by lenient legislation regarding legislation either about transfer-pricing rule, 
either about interest’s deductibility from related party loans, as we may see further. However, 
we need to account for country aspects to fully understand fiscal systems, such as population 
size, production, firm’s size or labour characteristics. Haufler and Runkel (2012) argument 
smaller countries may not have incentives to increase its nominal tax rate. Over the past few 
decades, marginal tax rates on corporate income have declined for most OECD’s countries, 
with exemption for France, as we can see in Annex 1 
2.2 Corporate Tax Rate 
It is known that tax rate differential7 exerts a significant influence over profit-shifting 
activities (Weichenrieder, 2009). On a meta-analysis investigation conducted by Heckemeyer 
and Overesch (2017), they found that a one percentage point smaller tax rate differential is 
associated with a raise in a subsidiary’s pre-tax profit by approximately 0.8 percent. 
The legislation in force in some countries is established in order to ensure a healthier 
economic conjuncture and to inspire either domestic investment and Foreign Direct 
Investment. As Pereira (2011) showed, an increase in corporate tax rate by one percentage 
point may lead to a decrease, in average, of about 3.22 percentage points on the weight of 
FDI on GDP in that year. There are a large variety of studies that show this negative 
relationship between corporate tax rates and Foreign Direct Investment, although they also 
vary in the conclusion’s magnitude. That may be possible due to many possible measures of 
effective tax rates as explanatory variables and the use of different dependent variables and 
estimations’ methods. Both Lohse (2013) and Marques & Pinho (2016) started its 
investigation by demonstrating that a raise in the corporate tax rate has a negative impact on 
                                                          
7 Both Tax Rates and Tax Bases vary widely among countries. 
8 
 
reported profits. We trust our research will continue to confirm that trend, which leads us to 
our first hypothesis: 
𝑯𝟏: The tax rate difference has a negative relationship with EBIT. 
2.3 Transfer-Pricing 
The most varied literature sustains our premise that companies move profits abroad, 
in response to tax rates. However, the magnitude of that response may decrease in the 
presence of stricter legislation. Lohse (2013) and Buettner (2018), have proved that tax-rate 
sensitivity is greater in the presence of binding legislation regarding transfer-pricing and thin-
capitalization rules, respectively.  
The two authors differ in the way they analyse profit shifting. While Lohse first focus 
on an operational indicator, Earnings Before Interests and Taxes, and then, on a financial 
indicator, Profit Before Taxes, Buettner uses total Property, Plant and Equipment and its 
main dependent variable, withdrawn from balance sheets, in opposite to EBIT and profit 
before taxes, which are obtained from financial statements.  
Transfer price is the price at which one division or subsidiary of a company transact 
with each other, such as the trade of supplies or intermediated goods between departments 
or between firms belonging to the same group8. Transfer-prices are used between related 
parties, which must be treated as separated entities, and must obey to the Arm’s Length 
Principle (ALP), whose rule states that charged prices must be equal to those that were 
charges if both parties were unrelated. Suppose both firm A and firm B belong to the same 
multinational group M. A is located in a low-corporate tax rate country (10%) and B is based 
in a country whose tax rate is higher (15%) and they both sell product P at 200€. Firm B buys 
from supplier S at 100€ and makes 100€ of operating profits. However, if firm A buys from 
S at 100€ and then sells it to B for 150€, firm B only profits 50€ per unit. This transfer 
mispricing leads to tax avoidance and profit shifting from a high-tax country to a low-tax 
jurisdiction.  
                                                          
8 In 1998, the share of intra-firm exports in total manufacturing exports is 51% in Sweden. In 2009, such kind 
of trade accounted for 48% of U goods imports and about 30% of US goods exports (Lanz et al. 2011). 
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Transfer-Pricing regulations have been in constant developments since a few years 
ago. It can be seen in Annex 2 that, initially, some countries didn’t have any formal written 
legislation over transfer-pricing issues but evolution has been gradually made on it. Using a 
measure of transfer-pricing risk developed by Mescal & Klasse (2014), De Mooji & Liu, 2018 
concluded that the introduction of TP rules had a negative impact on multinational 
investment for the years between 2006 and 2014 in most OECD countries.  
On the other way, following Lohse & Riedel (2013) there is are also Marques and 
Pinho (2016), whose main goal of their paper was also to investigate whether the introduced 
more stringent transfer-pricing (TP) legislation resulted in a decrease of reported profits 
abroad. The last ones contributed by constructing an index for Transfer-pricing strictness, 
based both its regulation and enforcement weighted by factors that internationals experts 
considered relevant. 
In 2012, Lohse presented a way to evaluate TP strictness into 6 categories, according 
to information contained in transfer-pricing guidelines elaborated by the Big Four 
International Audit Firms about tax audits, documentation requirements, penalties, among 
other things. The built evaluation was used in other papers, such as Lohse & Riedel (2013) 
and Buettner et al. (2018). In contrast, Marques and Pinho (2016) built an index, between 0 
and 1, based on regulation and enforcement mechanisms and information withdrawn from 
Transfer-pricing reports elaborated by PwC, Deloitte, KPMG or EY and surveys sent to 
international experts.  
Firms adjust prices for intrafirm trade to lower tax base in high-tax countries 
(Swenson, 2001 and Clausing, 2003). A company on a high-tax jurisdiction has incentive to 
undervalue prices charged to an affiliate in order to reduce its tax base while a subsidiary 
based in a low-tax jurisdiction has an incentive to overvalue prices charged to another affiliate 
or parent-firm located in a higher whose corporate tax rate is higher (Cristea & Nguyen, 
2015). Marques & Pinho (2016) and Lohse & Riedel (2013) concluded that harsher legislation 
and the extension requirements for transfer-pricing decreased reported results. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is tested:  
𝑯𝟐: Stricter Transfer-Pricing legislation reduces reported EBIT. 
10 
 
2.4 Thin-Capitalization 
Similar to Transfer-prices, interest rates on loans celebrated between related parties 
must also obey to the ALP. Subsidiaries of multinational firms located in high-tax countries 
tend to borrow from entities based in low-tax countries (Desai et al. 2004, Huizinga et al. 
2008 and Buettner & Wamser, 2013). MNCs make use of the financial structure of foreign 
activities in order to modify worldwide allocation of taxable profits. Intercompany debt 
financing is used to generate interest payments that are subject to tax in low-tax jurisdictions 
and deducted for tax purposes in countries with higher corporate rates. This leads to the 
hypothesis that tax-rate differentials give rise to thinly capitalized affiliates of MNEs 
(distorting equity and long-term debt distribution). Firms operating on foreign countries 
abroad can minimize its overall tax payments, in comparison with domestic firms, by lending 
from the affiliate facing the lowest tax rate compared to all other firms within the same group 
facing higher rates (Mintz & Smart, 2004). As a consequence, some countries, especially those 
with higher tax rates, imposed limits on deducted interests related with loans obtained from 
related parties. The implemented rules state that if a firm’s debt in proportion to its equity is 
above a certain threshold level, deduction is not allowed after that level is met. This threshold 
limit is known as the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio. Tax mechanisms are very heterogeneous 
inside the European Union so rules implemented in each country are far away from 
converging. Considering this limit deduction, some countries specify it either in function of 
total debt over equity, long-term debt over equity or total debt in function of total assets, 
among many others, as Blouin’s approach in its study in 2014. Recently, thin-capitalization 
rules in its main form have been abandoned and interest deductibility is now set in percentage 
of EBITDA9 or in absolute terms and there is the possibility to carry forward interest 
expenses. 
Before testing our hypothesis, many difficulties arise from the interpretation of each 
country’s tax legislation. Tax harmonization in European Union would mitigate the problems 
such as tax evasion and aggressive fiscal planning with the adoption of a common tax base, 
for example. Dourado & de la Feria (2008) discussed this problem in the context of the 
European Union. However, harmonization is not yet achievable due to several existing 
                                                          
9 In Portugal, interests are deductible up to one of the following amounts in 2018: a) 1M€ b) 30% of 
EBITDA. 
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differences. Nowadays, thin-capitalization rules and transfer-pricing restrictions are being 
differently evaluated and treated among countries. In what concerns to TCP rules, fiscal 
administrations may interpret related party debt from many views, going from long-term 
debt in proportion of equity, intra-firm debt over total assets, among many others. There is 
the need to restrict interests’ deductibility and intracompany debt because it is known that 
Multinationals make use of intercompany loans so they can shift profits abroad (Buettner et 
al., 2007).  
Peter Schwarz (2009), when examining tax-avoidance strategies of American 
Multinationals, reached to the conclusion that American MNEs benefit from globalization, 
allowing them to retain more income in tax havens and to finance their subsidiaries in high-
tax jurisdictions by a larger extent with debt. This result suggest that the financial structure 
of foreign affiliates is implemented in a way to minimize tax bills. In 2014, Blouin examined 
the impact of Thin-capitalization (TCP) rules on the leverage of the foreign affiliates of US 
multinationals and he managed to show TCP regimes restrict the ratio of an affiliate’s total 
debt to assets in about 43% of cases, which makes us believe that tighter TCP legislation 
diminishes reported profits in low-tax countries. Most recently, Buettner et al. (2018) 
conducted a panel-data analysis with fixed-effects showing that companies reacted to stricter 
thin-capitalization rules by decreasing its FDI, in the form of fixed assets. 
Given this, we expect that harsher thin-capitalization policies decline reported profits 
sensibility to tax-rate differentials, which is the same as stating that more severe thin-
capitalization rules are effective in reducing international income shifting. Thus, our third 
and last hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
𝑯𝟑: Stricter Thin-Capitalization rules decreases reported EBIT. 
In the next section, we will present the sample selection criteria, the variables 
definition and the methodology used to estimate the proposed models. 
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3. Variables, Sample Selection and Methodology  
This section is developed with the goal of showing our data selection, the sample and 
variables specifications and the adopted estimation method. The section is presented as 
follows: first, we define the variables that are part of our estimations; second, we describe 
the sample and, lastly, we introduce you the adopted estimation method. 
3.1 Variables Definition 
3.1.1 Dependent Variables 
The goal of this paper is to show whether reported results have been reduced or not 
due to the policies that were put into practice. Given that one of the main channels of income 
shifting is through transfer mispricing, we should consider an operational indicator, available 
on financial statements, as our dependent variable. Besides various methods used to capture 
and measure BEPS magnitude (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013 and Dharmapala, 2014), the 
literature is consensual on which best indicator to use, so we will follow Lohse & Riedel 
(2013) and Marques & Pinho (2016) and adopt Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
as our main dependent variable.  
3.1.2 Independent Variables 
I will use 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 as the independent variable that explains motivations to move 
income that derive from tax rate differences. 𝜏_Diff is given by subtracting from the host-
country combined corporate income tax rate the corporate income tax rate in the country 
where the parent-company has its headquarters. Alternatively, there is the possibility to 
estimate a model using the host-country CITR (corporate income tax rate) (𝜏) instead of 
𝜏_Diff, as Buettner et al. (2018) did. However, using the CITR may potentially introduce 
endogeneity as the home-country tax rate is associated with subsidiary’s reporting earnings 
(as a result of profit shifting) as well as with host country’s level of investment (Becker & 
Riedel 2012 suggest that home country’s corporate tax rate has a significant negative impact 
on the subsidiary’s capital stock and location, respectively). 
TP measures the strictness of transfer-pricing legislation in European countries. As 
it is the case for most of our variables, it is also difficult to compute a variable regarding TP 
13 
 
that is consensual to common literature and capable of representing with total accuracy the 
strictness level of existing legislation. Our TP variable is a dummy one, that assumes the 
value of 1 if a country is classified into category 4 or category 5 of Lohse et al. (2012) and 0 
if it assumes the categories 0, 1, 2 or 3. We have to interpret information transfer-pricing 
guidelines made available from the Big 4 International audit firms. Its Transfer-Price 
Guidelines are made annually gives us information over determinant factors regarding each 
country, such as: potential for relief from penalties; Documentation requirements and 
deadlines; statute of limitations; required disclosures; transfer pricing-specific returns; 
frequency of tax audits and transfer pricing scrutiny by the tax authority and opportunities 
for Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). Next, we show you the mentioned categories 
developed by Lohse et al. (2012) that we used to compute TP variable: 
Table 2. Categorization of Transfer-Pricing Strictness.  
Category Description 
Category 0 
No general anti-avoidance rule/no transfer pricing regulations or 
documentation requirements exists 
Category 1 
Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general anti-
avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, but no documentation 
requirement 
Category 2 
Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general anti-
avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documentation requirement 
is not introduced in national tax law, but required to exist in practice 
(audit) 
Category 3 
Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general anti-
avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law, but full documentation 
must only be available upon request 
Category 4 
Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general anti-
avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation requirement 
is introduced in national tax law), a short disclosure of documentation is 
required 
Category 5 
Arm’s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or general anti-
avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation requirement 
is introduced in national tax law), a long disclosure of documentation is 
required 
Source: Lohse et. al (2012) 
Tax administrations usually allow for interests to be deducted until a certain amount 
of debt in proportion of its equity is met, whose limit is given by the safe-haven debt-to-
equity ratio 𝜎. Buettner et al. (2018) have built Thin-capitalization tightness (TCP) as an 
indicator between 0 and 1, that applies for a firm located in country 𝑖 in a given year 𝑡:  
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𝑻𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝝈𝒊𝒕
(𝟏) 
 
Most recently, some countries, such as Germany, Spain or Portugal10, have left thin-
capitalization rules and have imposed an interest deduction’s limit in percentage of a 
companies’ EBITDA. Also, some countries deny excess interest payments for deduction and 
reclassify them as dividend payments, implying additional withholding taxes are charged. 
Last, but not least, the safe-haven ratio refers to total debt in some jurisdictions while other 
states consider loans provided by the parent company or even borrowings granted from 
related parties (Blouin et al., 2014). To overcome this, we will abandon the previous idea and 
contribute to the existing literature with a new way of evaluating legislation’s strictness 
regarding interest deductibility. Therefore, we will construct 3 categoric variables. Category 
1 comprises either countries with no specific rules and countries which TCP ratio is above 
3:1; category 2 includes countries with a TCP ratio equal to or below 3:1 and above 1:1. 
Lastly, category 3 comprises countries either whose TCP ratio is equal to 1:1 and, mainly, 
countries which limit the amount of expenses with interest that can be deducted from the 
tax base in function of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and/or in function of absolute 
amounts. 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
Our estimation will include a set of time-varying control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡, comprising 
both firm and country characteristics. Firm’s total fixed assets and cost of employees will be 
taken as proxies for capital and labour inputs, respectively. Country characteristics like 
market size and productivity are measured by its proxies GDP and GDP per capita, 
respectively, both with natural logarithm.  
3.2 Sample Selection 
We collect data for the described variables from various sources. Gathering relevant 
information from international experts about many countries for a relatively broad period is 
one of the main challenges of our study. There is the need to conduct a careful research, so 
                                                          
10 Portugal has adopted this new kind of regulation since 2013. 
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we have to gather data that reflects the strictness of the implemented legislation, i.e, 
transforming information available on legislation into quantifiable accurate variables. 
Our empirical analysis is based on annual subsidiary-level data constituted by 
European subsidiaries of multinationals located in Europe Union (28) and in Switzerland, 
during the 2008-2016 period. A subsidiary enters the sample if there is a European 
multinational placed in a different country that owns11, at least, 50.01% of the subsidiary’s 
capital. We then restrict our sample to firms with only positive EBIT and with available 
accounting information about its fixed assets and the cost of its employees. We have 
excluded subsidiaries whose industry classification, according to the NACE Rev. 2 main 
sections, fitted either categories A, B, K or L. The excluded firms are active in agriculture, 
fishing and forestry; mining and quarrying or who belong to the financial or insurance sectors 
as also companies who perform real estate activities, where specific tax conditions apply 
(Buettner et al., 2018).  
Information about subsidiaries’ financial statements, such as EBIT, Fixed Assets and 
Cost of Employees can be found on the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database, as well as the 
ownership details. Second, variables regarding Transfer-pricing and Thin-capitalization rules 
are built with information available on EY’s Transfer-Pricing Global Reference Guide12 and 
on EY’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide13, respectively. Third, combined corporate income 
tax rates were obtained from OECD International Tax Database14 and from EY’s Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide, for countries who are part OECD and for those who aren’t, 
respectively. Lastly, host-country characteristics15 (GDP and GDP per capita) can be taken 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database and are presented in euros, 
at current prices, after merging it with information on Exchange Rates16 taken from OECD 
                                                          
11 Ultimate Owner is the highest quoted Company in the path as owner, whatever its shareholders, that holds 
at least, 50.01% of the subsidiary’s capital, direct or indirectly, according to Amadeus. 
12 https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/global-tax-guide-archive [Accessed on January 2019]. 
13 https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/global-tax-guide-archive [Accessed on January 2019]. 
14 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_II1 [Accessed on November 2018] 
15Available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=World-Development-Indicators# 
[Accessed on November 2018]. 
16 Available at OECD National Accounts Statistics database https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00004-
en [Accessed on  November 2018]. 
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database. This information is summarized in Table 4., along with variable definitions and its 
expected signs.  
Table 3. Variables Definition, Expected Relationship and its Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Expected 
Sign 
EBIT 
Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes 
Amadeus  
𝜏_Diff Tax Rate Difference 
OECD Tax Database and 
EY’s WWCT Guide 
- 
TP Transfer-Pricing Strictness 
EY’s Transfer-Pricing Global 
Reference Guide 
- 
TCP 
Thin-capitalization 
Tightness 
EY’s Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guide 
- 
Capital Total Fixed Assets Amadeus + 
Labour Total Employees’ Cost Amadeus + 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product 
(current prices) 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
Database 
+/- 
GDP per 
capita 
Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (current prices) 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
Database 
+ 
The resulting dataset captures 21 018 foreign subsidiaries belonging to 8 282 different 
multinationals operating in European countries over 9 years (2008-2016), which means that, 
in average, each multinational owns 2.5 affiliates. The largest parent-company owns 112 
subsidiaries; however, the median value of subsidiaries is 1. A country distribution of the 
affiliates and corresponding parent companies is presented in Table 4. The most represented 
countries are Romania, France, Spain and Italy while we couldn’t manage to include in our 
observation any subsidiary located in Switzerland, Cyprus, Greece or Lithuania. This has to 
do with the specifications of our variables and corresponding availability of required data in 
AMADEUS, so we can’t conclude that France is a country that hosts most of foreign 
subsidiaries in Europe, for example. We also present the distribution of industry classification 
of our subsidiaries, according to NACE code, in Annex 4. 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 5 and will be discussed in subsection 
4.1. 
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Table 4. Distribution of subsidiaries  
Country Subsidiaries 
Parent-
Company 
 
Country Subsidiaries 
Parent-
Company 
Austria 20 486  Ireland 198 137 
Belgium 1 668 258  Italy 2 059 1 292 
Bulgaria 348 27  Lithuania 0 15 
Switzerland 0 399  Luxembourg 47 237 
Cyprus 0 88  Latvia 3 25 
Czech 
Republic 
1 628 229  Malta 3 32 
Germany 1 100 1 998  Netherlands 66 300 
Denmark 0 213  Poland 1 483 72 
Estonia 285 10  Portugal 822 95 
Spain 2 040 347  Romania 2 473 31 
Finland 408 162  Sweden 748 211 
France 2 065 618  Slovenia 233 44 
Greece 0 132  
Slovak 
Republic 
836 89 
Croatia 322 21  Great-Britain 1681 543 
Hungary 482 171  Total 21 018 8 282 
Table 3. displays by host-country the distribution of subsidiaries (our observations) and the 
location of the corresponding parent companies. 
Source: AMADEUS Bureau van Dijk 
3.3 Methodology 
The background literature on anti-BEPS legislation is still scarce. There are not many 
authors who have investigated the effect of tougher regulation on profit shifting channels on 
the amount of reported profits by multinational’s affiliates. Lohse & Riedel (2013) and 
Marques & Pinho (2016) have both conducted a panel-data analysis with control for fixed 
effects in their investigation. They both incorporated: a set of control variables to control for 
firm and country characteristics; subsidiary fixed effects that allow to control for subsidiary 
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and a full set of one-digit NACE industry-year fixed 
effects. The latest also included a full set of year dummies to pick up shocks over time that 
18 
 
are common to all affiliates. Most recently, Buettner et al. (2018) managed to prove that 
tighter thin-capitalization rules in OECD countries led to a reduction of FDI made by 
German multinational corporations, by developing a panel-data analysis for 1996-2007, with 
control for subsidiary-specific fixed effects and aggregate time effects and other 
characteristics. 
In testing our hypotheses, we need variables that mirror the strictness of anti-BEPS 
implemented legislation so we can trust results derived from the regressions. However, there 
are also many other factors that may explain variations in reported results, besides Transfer-
pricing or thin-capitalization rules. Therefore, control variables representing country and 
firm characteristics are also essential for this investigation. We estimate our models using 
Eviews software (Version 10). 
Approaching a panel-data analysis with control for fixed effects allows us to elaborate 
our study in both cross-section and time series, according to both Lohse & Riedel (2013), 
Marques & Pinho (2016) and Buettner et al. (2018). The observational unit of our analysis is 
the multinational affiliate per year and the regressions assume the following form: 
ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
where ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇it is the natural logarithm of Earnings Before Interests and Taxes of affiliate 
i in country t, 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the difference of combined corporate income tax rate between the 
affiliate’s host-country and the country where the parent-company is located, for year t. 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 
represents transfer-pricing strictness in country i at time t, while 𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 represents Thin-
capitalization rule’s strictness at time t in country i where the affiliate is located. Next, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector of additional controls intended to account both for firm and country characteristics, 
𝜑𝑖 accounts for subsidiary fixed effects, which will allow to control for subsidiary time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand, 𝜌𝑡 represents a full set of year 
dummies to pick up shocks over time that are common to all affiliates. Last, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents 
the error term.  
We start by confirming our premises that increasing the tax rate difference shrinks 
reported profits, so our first model for H1 is: 
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ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.1) 
After confirming H1, we then proceed to test if tighter transfer-pricing legislation 
increases the elasticity of reported EBIT to the tax rate difference between host-country 
and home-country, so we will test H2 with: 
ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡  x 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2.2) 
Similarly, we will test if tighter thin-capitalization rules also increase the elasticity of 
reported EBIT to the tax rate difference between host-country and home-country, isolated 
from the effects of transfer-pricing rules, so for H3 we have: 
ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2.3) 
These last two hypotheses may also be tested together, which leads us to the main 
model (A) presented above: 
ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡  x 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
Alternatively, we will also test these hypotheses by using the CITR (𝜏) at the host-
country instead of the CITR difference between host and home countries (𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓), 
following the same steps as previously, with only one change, so the model takes the 
following form: 
ln 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝜏𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5(𝜏𝑖𝑡 x 𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
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4. Results 
In this section, we present the main results of our estimation models. The section is 
presented as follows: first, we present the univariate results, with a brief analysis of the 
descriptive statistics, and second, the multivariate results, with the main findings related to 
our hypotheses. 
4.1 Univariate Results 
Table 5. presents the descriptive statistics of the variables chosen for the 
development of this study. As introduced in table 4. there are firms in our observation from 
24 different countries and 8 different industry-classifications. This results in high standard-
deviations for firm-level variables, such as EBIT, Fixed Assets and Cost of Employees. The 
difference between the maximum amounts verified and the median values, illustrate that well, 
appointing for differences in firm dimensions and performance. We can also find high 
variations for both country-level variables GDP and GDPPER CAPITA, with the highest 
GDPPER CAPITA being almost 94 thousand euros, while the least of it was around 5.45 
thousand € per year, both at current prices. 
The average corporate income tax rate in the countries where our observations are 
based in is about 24%, although there is a country that in a given year practised a tax rate of 
almost 38%, while the lenient country applied a tax rate of only 10%, when compared. This 
analysis can be further complemented with the one available in Annex 1, where we can see 
tax rates in charge in EU-28 countries and in Switzerland since 2008 to 2016. The 
average 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 is about 1.30%, although there are countries with greater gaps, so it should 
important to log some variables in order to study elasticity effects. In what concerns to the 
legislation’s strictness indicators, we can see that a large part of our sample has strict transfer-
pricing legislation during the 2008-2016 period since around 80% of our sample assumes the 
value 1 for dummy TP. However, we can’t advance with the conclusion that increasing 
Transfer-Pricing legislation resulted in less profit shifting. Finally, regarding thin-
capitalization rules, we can observe that almost 58% of the observed firms faced TCP rules 
that fall into Category 3, while around 31% of them were based in countries where TCP ratio 
was equal to or below 3:1 and above 1:1. Consequently, about 11% of our sample faced the 
least strict TCP rules since 2008 to 2016. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
EBIT 3974.500 406.8653 3201185 -979108.7 28031.58 189162 
FA 27379.00 746.4620 28641793 -124904.1 307244.9 189162 
CEMP 8331.866 1343.846 3393383.7 -0.461000 41929.93 189162 
GDP 444703842.3 148409119.7 3078444496 6917105.47 735740237 189162 
GDPPCPT 23.57456 24.72000 93.77000 5.450000 11.77411 189162 
𝜏  0.240765 0.230000 0.379962 0.100000 0.069023 189162 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓  0.012999 0.020000 0.294962 -0.279962 0.103378 189162 
TP 0.821571 1.000 1.000 0.000000 0.382875 189162 
CAT. 2 0.312536 0.000000 1.000 0.000000 0.463528 189162 
CAT. 3 0.575094 1.000 1.000 0.000000 0.494330 189162 
INT  3417.492  2.191955  5892968.2 -471803.95  54924.44  177588 
Table 5. summarizes univariate statistics for both firm-level and country-level variables. EBIT is Earnings 
Before Interests and Taxes, FA is Fixed Assets of a firm, CEMP is the cost of employees a given firm has in a 
given year and GDP is Gross Domestic Product at current prices and GDPPCPT represents GDP per capita, 
also at current prices. All these values are represented in thousands of Euros. Next, 𝜏 is the combined corporate 
income tax rate applicable in the host-country of observable firm while 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 is given by subtracting 
corporate income tax rate in the home-country of parent-firm from the corporate income tax rate in the host-
country of the corresponding affiliate; TP is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if transfer-pricing strictness is 
categorized into 4 or 5 and assumes the value of 0 otherwise, according to Lohse et al. (2012). Cat.2 and Cat.3 
are both categoric variables reflecting thin-capitalization rules tightness, where a firm enters into Cat.2 if it is 
located in a country whose TCP ratio is equal to or below 3:1 and above 1:1; it falls into Category 3 if countries 
limit the amount of interest deductible either  in function of EBITDA and in absolute terms or whose TCP 
ratio is 1:1. INT refers to intangible assets reported by firms on theirs accounts. 
Additionally, Table 6. shows Pearson’s correlation between all variables, thus 
allowing us to study the relationship between the variables and to detect potential 
multicollinearity problems. Since Fixed Assets and Cost of Employees are introduced as 
proxies for capital and labour in the production function, we understand the relatively high 
and positive relationship between EBIT and FA (0.518) or CEMP (0.366). GDP and 
GDPPCPT have also a positive correlation with our dependent variable. Surprisingly, corporate 
tax rate 𝜏 appears to be positive correlated with EBIT, which may indicate further problems 
in our estimations since we expect that higher corporate income rates result in a reduction 
of reported results by foreign subsidiaries. On the other hand, 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 has a negative 
correlation either with EBIT, FA or CEMP, which may suggest more significant regressions 
using that variable. As expected, 𝜏 and 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 are strong and positively correlated (0.62). 
Finally, variables representing both TP and TCP strictness have small correlations with all 
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the remaining variables. In general, the correlation coefficients have low values suggesting 
that are no collinearity issues. 
Table 6. Pearson's Correlation Matrix 
 EBIT FA CEMP GDP GDPPCPT 𝜏 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 TP CAT. 2 CAT. 3 
EBIT  1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
FA  0.518  1.000 - - - - - - - - 
CEMP  0.408  0.366  1.000 - - - - - - - 
GDP  0.041  0.007  0.067  1.000 - - - - - - 
GDPPCPT  0.057  0.042  0.105  0.274  1.000 - - - - - 
𝜏  0.009  0.027  0.043 -0.147  0.551  1.000 - - - - 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 -0.005 -0.0001  0.021 -0.121  0.330  0.642  1.000 - - - 
TP  0.017  0.009  0.029  0.196 -0.017  0.063  0.021  1.000 - - 
CAT. 2 -0.0199  0.007 -0.033 -0.204  0.052  0.123  0.043 -0.366  1.000 - 
CAT. 3  0.033  0.004  0.056  0.234 -0.062 -0.018  0.013  0.369 -0.784  1.000 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
In this section, we analyse the results of equations (2) and (3), which are estimated 
in a panel data analysis with control either for cross-section and period fixed-effects. 
Table 7. presents coefficient estimates from estimating our baseline Equation (2). 
Consisting with our prediction in Hypothesis 1, the results suggest that increasing the 
corporate income tax rate by 10 percentage points decreases reported results by 7.1%. Three 
of our four control variables (Fixed Assets, Cost of Employees and GDP) have a positive 
and significant impact on reported results by foreign subsidiaries. They are both statistically 
significant either at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. GDPPER CAPITA has a negative sign and its variable 
isn’t statistically significant at any level. These conclusions regarding the control variables are 
maintained when analysing all columns of Table 7. 
In column (2), we add the TP variable to test whether reported results decrease with 
more rigorous transfer-pricing legislation. As we can see, the introduction of stricter TP rules 
resulted in a higher elasticity of EBIT to differences in corporate income tax rates between 
the host-country and the home-country. Both 𝜏𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 and TP are statistically significant at 1% 
level, although, the interaction term, 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓*TP couldn’t prove to be statically significant 
(t-statistic = 0.897698).  
In column (3), we estimate the effect of stricter thin-capitalization rules, by ordering 
them into 3 categories, isolated from the effects of more severe TP rules. According to the 
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estimated results, if we move from Category 1 (almost no rules or very lenient rules) to 
Category 2, the tax rate difference semi-elasticity rises, compared with column (1), for 
example. However, the conclusion doesn’t come up if we move from Category 2 to category 
3, which may be due to incorrect variable specifications or due to a sample not illustrative of 
our problem. Either the interaction terms (𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 *CAT. 2 and 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 *CAT. 3) and the 
variables itself (Category 2 and Category 3) aren’t statistically significant at 10, 5 or 1% level. 
The estimated results do not match with the ones found by Buettner et al. (2018) and by 
Lohse and Riedel (2013) in their additional analysis. 
In column (4), we aggregate both effects in order to account for possible substitution 
effects between the two channels of profit shifting (debt financing and transfer-pricing). Just 
as in column (3), we couldn’t find evidence that confirmed H3 so we cannot say that stricter 
legislation regarding interest deductibility resulted in lower profit shifting. On the opposite, 
we can confirm H2 by looking at the signs and magnitudes of both TP variable and its 
interaction term with 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓, following the conclusions of Marques & Pinho (2016) and 
Lohse and Riedel (2013).  
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Table 7. Stricter TP and TCP legislation and BEPS (using CITR difference) 
This table presents regression results on the effectiveness of stricter legislation measures to combat for BEPS 
in EU for the 2008–2016 period. We use Earnings Before Interests and Taxes as the dependent variable. 
Independent Variables are described in section 3. We additionally interact the variables representing the 
combined corporate income tax rate difference with the variables representing the legislation’s strictness. The 
estimation includes firm and period fixed effects. We report t-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable EBIT (1) EBIT (2) EBIT (3) EBIT (4) 
C -0.694570       
(-0.885678) 
-1.413515*     
(-1.709318) 
-0.941566      
(-1.069588) 
-1.849887**  
(-1.962196) 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓  -0.711664*** 
(-6.653166) 
-0.696862*** 
(-4.920326) 
-0.701681*** 
(-4.194964) 
-0.641817*** 
(-3.376974) 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓*TP  0.078918 
(0.897698)  
0.072765 
(0.806886) 
TP  -0.041450*** 
(-3.468110)  
-0.043478*** 
(-3.599429) 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓*CAT. 2  
 
0.035514 
(0.193131) 
-0.003192      
(-0.017319) 
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓*CAT.3  
 
-0.032641      
(-0.220629) 
-0.073523      
(-0.494291) 
CATEGORY 2   
 
-0.000173      
(-0.008897) 
-0.001565      
(-0.080169) 
CATEGORY 3  
 
-0.005607      
(-0.393632) 
-0.012299      
(-0.848163) 
FA 0.056349*** 
(19.11975) 
0.056319*** 
(19.10930) 
0.056331*** 
(19.11215) 
0.056287*** 
(19.09737) 
CEMP 0.460811*** 
(72.89351) 
0.460336*** 
(72.80133) 
0.460866*** 
(72.89185) 
0.460414*** 
(72.80713) 
GDP 0.178606*** 
(4.004424) 
0.223107*** 
(4.701597) 
0.195390*** 
(3.753247) 
0.252884*** 
(4.493033 
GDPPCPT -0.020795       
(-0.435116) 
-0.046345      
(-0.942466) 
-0.042083      
(-0.711186 
-0.083493      
(-1.345154) 
R-squared 0.877423 0.877433 0.877423 0.877435 
Adjusted R-squared 0.859844 0.859854 0.859841 0.859852 
F-statistic 49.91273 49.91219 49.90206 49.90194 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total panel (unbalanced) 
observations 166 371 166 371 166 371 166 371 
Table 8. presents coefficients estimates from estimating regression (3), where we use 
the combined CITR (𝜏) at the host-country instead of the combined CITR (𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓) 
difference between host and home countries. We start by estimating the elasticity response 
of reported EBIT to home country’s corporate income tax rate and then estimate the effect 
of stricter implemented legislation regarding the two main channels of profit shifting.  
Column (1) sustains our premises that companies shift income in response to higher 
tax rates in charge, with the coefficient associated with 𝜏 being negative and, in absolute 
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terms, higher than the coefficient estimated in column (1) of Table 7. The sensitivity of EBIT 
to the tax rate yields a coefficient of -1.715 with significance at the 1% level. This semi-
elasticity means that an increase of one percentage point in the corporate income tax rate is 
associated with a reduction in the subsidiaries’ reported EBIT of, around, 1.72%.  
The second regression in Table 8. includes a dummy variable for transfer-pricing and 
its interaction term with 𝜏. We found that subsidiaries placed in countries where stricter TP 
legislation has been implemented react less strongly to tax rate variations, so the sensitivity 
of EBIT to the tax rate is lower for foreign affiliates that face tighter transfer-pricing 
requirements. If evaluated at the tax elasticity for 2008, the results imply that shifting 
activities are reduced by around 26% (=0.624/-2.356). 
Column (3) shows the tax rate sensitivity of reported Earnings Before Interests and 
Taxes when firms are confronted with changes in thin-capitalization rules. The sign of 
coefficients associated with the categoric variables and its interaction with 𝜏 follow Buettner 
et al. (2018). However, Category 3 variable isn’t statistically significant and its magnitude is 
lower than the associated with Category 2, contradicting our expectations. This can be 
justified if the implemented rules that allowed countries to classify into Category 3 were put 
into practice during a short period or if. These same countries, traditionally, may have already 
strong and effective legislation regarding interest deductibility. Nevertheless, we can rely that 
thin-capitalization rules have made its positive impact in reducing international income 
shifting, especially when moving from Category 1 to Category 2.  
The conclusion made for column (2) and column (3) remain the same when 
estimating regression presented in column (4).  
In summary, our estimates indicate that the introduction of stricter transfer-pricing 
rules have been effective in decreasing international income-shifting made by multinational 
groups through their foreign subsidiaries. It is also proved that tax rate differences motivate 
companies to reallocate profits abroad. Thin-capitalization rules are also effective, although 
we couldn’t prove association between declined reported results in function of the three 
categories of thin-capitalization rules. 
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Table 8. Stricter TP and TCP legislation and BEPS (using CITR) 
This table presents regression results on the effectiveness of stricter legislation measures to combat for BEPS 
in EU for the 2008–2016 period. We use Earnings Before Interests and Taxes as the dependent variable. 
Independent Variables are described in section 3. We additionally interact the variables representing the 
combined corporate income tax rate with the variables representing the legislation’s strictness. The estimation 
includes firm and period fixed effects. We report t-statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable EBIT (1) EBIT (2) EBIT (3) EBIT (4) 
C 1.190741 
(1.466926) 
1.795803** 
(2.009627) 
0.535457 
(0.574078) 
1.450730 
(1.374051) 
𝜏  -1.715266*** 
(-11.14209) 
-2.355684*** 
(-10.29228) 
-2.097742***  
(-6.093840) 
-2.663219***  
(-6.850600) 
𝜏*TP  0.623949*** 
(4.452859) 
 0.648248*** 
(4.482548) 
TP  -0.197584*** 
(-4.667724) 
 -0.203956***  
(-4.712811) 
𝜏*CAT. 2   1.480987*** 
(3.047929) 
1.399015*** 
(2.864780) 
𝜏*CAT.3   0.137622 
(0.385175) 
0.008003 
(0.022219) 
CATEGORY 2    -0.417833*** 
(-3.160925) 
-0.406626***  
(-3.062255) 
CATEGORY 3   -0.039659      
(-0.447379) 
-0.002119       
(-0.023757) 
FA 0.056631*** 
(19.22005) 
0.056483*** 
(19.17009) 
0.056516*** 
(19.17971) 
0.056381*** 
(19.13406) 
CEMP 0.460791*** 
(72.92055) 
0.460736*** 
(72.89360) 
0.461188*** 
(72.95877) 
0.461166*** 
(72.94303) 
GDP 0.101072** 
(2.224994) 
0.074163 
(1.486732) 
0.147356*** 
(2.724755) 
0.098721 
(1.616477) 
GDPPCPT -0.031568      
(-0.660943) 
-0.000995      
(-0.020046) 
-0.065967     
(-1.081415) 
-0.009646       
(-0.147151) 
R-squared 0.877490 0.877508 0.877504 0.877522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.859921 0.859940 0.859932 0.859952 
F-statistic 49.94396 49.94702 49.93933 49.94258 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total panel 
(unbalanced) 
observations 166 371 166 371 166 371 166 371 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
In the additional analysis, we test if companies with greater value of registered 
intangible assets could escape easier to transfer-pricing legislation. In fact, profit shifting 
activities are larger in MNE’s with high intellectual property holdings and high R&D 
(Grubert, 2003) and the level of taxation itself can influence many factors, such as the 
probability of patent applications (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). 
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We will restrict our sample to companies whose weight of intangible assets on total 
fixed assets is greater than 20%. Some of our firms haven’t any intangible property recorded 
in their books, so our estimations have now 23 905 unbalanced observations. In subsection 
4.2 we confirmed our hypotheses 1 and 2, but we couldn’t prove that stricter interests’ 
deductibility rules resulted in ever lesser income-shifting by the introduction of a categoric 
variable into 3 categories. We will run our regressions either using the CITR (𝜏) and the CITR 
difference (𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓). Summing up, we will reestimate equations (2.1), (2.2), (3.1) and (3.2) 
for companies whose weight of intangible assets on total fixed assets is greater than 20% and 
compare with the estimations of columns 1-2 of both Table7. and Table8. 
Columns (1) and (3) from Table 9 show coefficients associated with the  
𝜏 and 𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 slightly higher than the ones shown by Column (1) of Table 7. and by column 
(1) of Table 8., respectively. These variables are statistically significant at 1% level.  
By comparing with results of previous subsection, we can state that multinational 
groups with higher shares of intangible assets registered in their accounts can make use of 
various instruments in order to shift income related to intangible property.  
Transfer-pricing methods aim at making sure transactions between related parties are 
treated as if it they were with independent parties. This difficulty arises with when we’re 
dealing with transaction with intangible property, whose volume of activity has been 
increasing in Europe. This is confirmed by both Columns (3) and (4) of Table9., when 
comparing with results from the previous section. Firstly, the introduction of tougher 
transfer-pricing rules is more effective when battling firms whose weight of intangible assets 
on total fixed assets isn’t greater than 20%. Second, for the firms with relatively higher shares 
of intangible assets, the difference between those who are based in countries with more 
severe legislation and those who are not, is substantially higher. 
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Table 9. Stricter TP and TCP legislation and BEPS for Intangible Assets 
This table presents regression results on the effectiveness of stricter transfer-pricing legislation measures to 
combat BEPS in EU for the 2008–2016 period, for firms whose intangible assets represent more than 20% of 
their registered fixed assets. We use Earnings Before Interests and Taxes as the dependent variable. 
Independent Variables are described in section 3. We additionally interact the variables representing both the 
combined corporate income tax rate difference and combined corporate income tax rate with the variables 
representing the legislation’s strictness. The estimation includes firm and period fixed effects. We report t-
statistic in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable EBIT (1) EBIT (2) EBIT (3) EBIT (4) 
C 2.470176 
(1.176525) 
3.206439 
(1.292614 
1.475263 
(0.709930 
-0.059745      
(-0.026189) 
𝜏  -1.764787*** 
(-4.184500) 
-3.100801*** 
(-4.050793) 
  
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓  
 
 -0.783564*** 
(-2.734528) 
-0.990065**  
(-2.460856) 
𝜏*TP 
 
1.323293*** 
(2.644401) 
  
𝜏_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓*TP 
 
  0.399666 
(1.584514) 
TP 
 
-0.453411*** 
(-2.867461) 
 -0.097423*** 
(-2.779280) 
FA 0.021327* 
(1.931637) 
0.020659* 
(1.870928) 
0.020278* 
(1.836783) 
0.020196* 
(1.829003 
CEMP 0.437364*** 
(22.09461 
0.436433*** 
(22.03987) 
0.439073*** 
(22.18239 
0.436971*** 
(22.06153) 
GDP -0.010937      
(-0.091527) 
-0.028195       
(-0.205241) 
0.002973 
(0.024892 
0.096404 
(0.730736) 
GDPPCPT 0.413502*** 
(2.653484) 
0.426556*** 
(2.710942) 
0.501304*** 
(3.267992 
0.465107*** 
(2.985093) 
R-squared 0.903516 0.903564 0.903464 0.903504 
Adjusted R-squared 0.873694 0.873742 0.873625 0.873665 
F-statistic 30.29680 30.29919 30.27840 30.27855 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total panel (unbalanced) 
observations 23 905 23 905 23 905 23 905 
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5. Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate whether international income-shifting has been 
contracted thanks to the implementation of harsher legislation regarding the main channels 
for profit shifting, transfer-pricing and intra-debt financing. The main purposes are: to 
investigate how affiliates of multinational groups react to tax rate differences; investigate if 
either stricter transfer-pricing specifications and thin-capitalization rules led to a reduction 
of reported results by subsidiaries and, finally, to see if companies with higher intangible 
property avoid the stricter rules implemented.  
In order to investigate what was mentioned above, we use a sample constituted by 
foreign affiliates of parent companies, both located in EU-28 plus Switzerland, over the 
period between 2008 and 2016. Our final sample has 21 018 foreign affiliates, distributed by 
different industries, according to a NACE code, and our data is organized in a panel data 
structure. Our results were presented after conducting a panel-data analysis with control for 
both cross-section and time fixed-effects, with EBIT being the dependent variable for all the 
regressions. 
Before we run our regressions, we had to classify transfer-pricing strictness in all 
countries, according to Lohse et. al, (2012) and then create a dummy variable TP that takes 
the value of 1 if a country was classified into categories 4 or 5 (the strictest categories), and 
takes the value of 0 otherwise. We also construct a categoric variable, representing the 
strictness of thin-capitalization legislation, according to the existing rules in each country in 
order to classify them into three categories, each representing even more tightness.  
We start to show that firms reallocate income in response to variations in tax rate 
differences between the host-country and the home-country. We then follow Marques et, al 
(2016) and Lohse and Riedel, (2013) by proving the effectiveness of increasing the tightness 
of transfer-pricing rules in the reduction of reported results by affiliates. However, we 
couldn’t find stronger evidence that the implemented thin-capitalization rules had impact on 
combating BEPS. We then repeated the study by using the corporate income tax rate in the 
host-country as the motivation for profit shifting (instead of corporate income tax rate 
difference between the host-country and the home-country). Once again, we succeeded to 
show that firms located in countries with tighter transfer-pricing rules have decreased 
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income-shifting compared to those who are not so we can state that transfer-pricing 
measures implemented by OECD have been successful. After that, our estimations suggested 
that thin-capitalization rules resulted in less reported results by affiliates, although we 
couldn’t prove that the reduction behaves as a sliding scale, when moving from the three 
categories.  
In addition, we wanted to know if companies with higher parts of intangible assets 
could escape easier to transfer-pricing specifications. We, therefore, rerun our regressions 
only for firms whose weight of intangible assets on total fixed assets was greater than 20%, 
so we could compare with the magnitude of signs from the previous regressions. As 
expected, firms with higher shares of intangible property respond strongly to tax rate 
variations and that tighter transfer-pricing rules lead to a drop of reported EBIT, but in a 
smaller dimension, when compared to firms with low or no intangible assets reported in their 
accounts. 
Our research adds new insights to the existing literature by exploring the 
effectiveness of implemented politics for a more recent period (2008-2016), giving lights for 
policymakers and advisors when studying and comprehending the evolution of BEPS. We 
also contribute by joining the two main channels of profit shifting into our study (transfer-
pricing and intra-debt financing) presenting new perspectives for measuring and quantifying 
the strictness of rules in the context of the European Union. 
This investigation has some limitations. First, the firms belonging to our sample 
aren’t equally distributed among countries, for example, jurisdictions like Ireland and 
Switzerland, sometimes criticized by their fiscal politics, are not really representative in our 
sample. Second, it is always difficult to make comparisons with so many countries involved 
and it is complicated to interpret each fiscal code and compare them because every country 
has each specifications and rules are not harmonized. Third, and in consequence, 
representing TP and TCP tightness is always subject to interpretation and not that 
quantifiable sometimes. Fourth, there are book-tax differences that can skew some studies. 
Moreover, it would be interesting in future research to examine only parent-companies 
belonging to a specific country and that have foreign affiliates in other countries, but also 
the introduction of other ways of evaluating existing legislation or even the conduction of 
Difference-in-Differences analysis for firms with different shares of intangible assets. 
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Annex 1. Combined Corporate Income Tax Rate in EU-28 and in Switzerland for the period 2008-
2016 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 
Belgium 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 33,0 
Bulgaria 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 
Switzerland 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 
Cyprus 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 12,5 12,5 12,5 
Czech Republic 21,0 20,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 
Germany 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 15,8 
Denmark 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 24,5 23,5 22,0 
Estonia 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 21,0 20,0 20,0 
Greece 25,0 25,0 24,0 20,0 20,0 26,0 26,0 29,0 29,0 
Spain 30,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 28,0 25,0 
Finland 26,0 26,0 26,0 26,0 24,5 24,5 20,0 20,0 20,0 
France 34,4 34,4 34,4 36,1 36,1 38,0 38,0 38,0 34,4 
Croatia 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 
Hungary 20,0 20,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 
Ireland 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 
Italy 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 27,5 
Lithuania 15,0 20,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 
Luxembourg 22,9 21,8 21,8 22,1 22,1 22,5 22,5 22,5 22,5 
Latvia 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 
Malta 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 35,0 
Netherlands 25,5 25,5 25,5 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 25,0 
Poland 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 
Portugal 25,0 25,0 25,0 27,0 30,0 30,0 30,0 28,0 28,0 
Romania 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 16,0 
Sweden 28,0 26,3 26,3 26,3 26,3 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 
Slovenia 22,0 21,0 20,0 20,0 18,0 17,0 17,0 17,0 17,0 
Slovak Republic 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 19,0 23,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 
Great-Britain 28,0 28,0 28,0 26,0 24,0 23,0 21,0 20,0 20,0 
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Annex 2. Transfer-Pricing classification according to Lohse et al. (2012) in EU-28 and in 
Switzerland (2008-2016) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Belgium 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech 
Republic 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Germany 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Denmark 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Estonia 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Greece 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Spain 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Finland 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
France 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Croatia 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Hungary 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Ireland 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Italy 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Lithuania 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malta 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Poland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Portugal 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Romania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Sweden 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Slovenia 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Slovak 
Republic 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Great-
Britain 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 
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Annex 3. Thin-Capitalization rules Classification in 28-EU and in Switzerland (2008-2016) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 
Belgium 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 
Bulgaria 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 
Switzerland - - - - - - - - - 
Cyprus - - - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 
Germany EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Denmark 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 
Estonia - - - - - - - - - 
Greece - - 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Spain 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Finland - - - - - - EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
France EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Croatia 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 
Hungary 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 
Ireland - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 4:1 EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Lithuania - - - - - - - - - 
Luxembourg 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 85:15 
Latvia 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 
Malta - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 
Poland 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 1:1  1:1 
Portugal 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA EBITDA 
Romania 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 
Sweden - 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Interest 
Income 
Slovenia 6:1 6:1 6:1 5:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 
Slovak 
Republic - - - - - - - EBITDA EBITDA 
Great-
Britain 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 
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Annex 4. Industry Classification Distribution 
Industry Classification (NACE Code) 
Number of 
Affiliates 
C. Manufacturing 6444 
D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 214 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities 
195 
F. Construction 733 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
7345 
H. Transportation and storage 1255 
I. Accommodation and food service activities 278 
J. Information and communication 1205 
M. Professional, scientific and technical activities 1715 
N. Administrative and support service activities 1022 
O. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 7 
P. Education 43 
Q. Human health and social work activities 358 
R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 89 
S. Other service activities 115 
Total 21 018 
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Annex 5. GDP, at current prices17, in EU-28 and in Switzerland for 2008-2016  
Country  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 353013,86 324574,15 315207,57 340041,40 322318,38 333210,36 339782,05 297752,77 304856,82 
Belgium 425481,20 393013,99 388927,84 415672,12 391957,36 403604,72 408129,44 354622,80 364724,80 
Bulgaria 44637,31 42082,78 40706,73 45288,14 42434,94 43200,99 43623,33 39121,32 41532,37 
Switzerland 454800,36 439208,34 469548,91 551785,74 525914,66 533442,02 545316,71 529385,67 521677,49 
Cyprus 22839,52 21041,70 20560,26 21632,87 19713,72 18660,34 17961,83 15334,09 15721,71 
Czech 
Republic 193383,76 167229,70 166878,80 179791,75 163256,26 162241,66 159799,20 145600,87 152354,37 
Germany 3078444,50 2772296,00 2748440,92 2963843,18 2789987,16 2907387,42 2991631,59 2630691,37 2712973,23 
Denmark 289897,76 260554,40 258987,62 271328,75 257546,66 266203,68 271429,87 234808,82 239407,51 
Estonia 19848,81 15939,86 15676,97 18275,27 18141,19 19475,86 20165,08 17586,95 18205,53 
Greece 290800,00 267658,58 240782,80 226997,37 193403,25 185841,25 182260,81 152390,19 150315,02 
Spain 1341368,25 1215898,82 1151479,42 1173696,68 1051775,57 1055142,85 1058757,67 933465,22 965162,84 
Finland 232782,63 203987,34 199310,60 215857,54 202091,14 209176,27 209619,37 181165,19 186188,63 
France 2394244,24 2182001,63 2125506,36 2256904,22 2112830,67 2177978,04 2193135,78 1900151,49 1923011,82 
Croatia 57823,05 50857,64 48122,18 49197,63 44530,94 45003,99 44313,47 38518,44 40048,36 
Hungary 129622,06 105922,93 105303,83 111040,30 100654,63 104762,96 107742,02 95762,46 98147,55 
Ireland 225626,70 191668,82 178520,14 188523,24 177580,54 185475,03 198461,88 226484,52 237784,44 
Italy 1961356,60 1772352,83 1709228,97 1795400,59 1631821,74 1650670,59 1654547,02 1428396,57 1450475,40 
Lithuania 39256,64 30367,61 29856,81 34291,91 33732,07 35963,41 37306,03 32348,61 33366,56 
Luxembourg 45819,14 41665,93 42799,91 47327,99 44619,50 47834,66 51001,55 45032,79 45737,36 
Latvia 29203,01 21226,00 19108,55 22261,02 22137,35 23440,84 24094,65 21020,57 21508,10 
Malta 7364,86 6917,11 7030,62 7499,05 7250,19 7860,27 8638,27 8240,58 8798,99 
Netherlands 768082,56 695857,25 672725,99 704941,23 652585,06 671489,80 676383,96 590726,41 606302,77 
Poland 437943,01 356712,51 385528,32 417110,57 393907,05 406168,37 419208,75 372014,21 367731,81 
Portugal 214951,29 197698,76 191672,46 193158,32 170334,98 175158,13 176570,87 155412,79 160061,13 
Romania 175241,81 140003,05 134046,79 145417,74 135142,30 148409,12 153397,93 138650,21 146504,40 
Sweden 421657,93 348488,80 392812,43 444146,55 428167,86 448400,04 441229,68 388039,03 401321,99 
Slovakia 82306,42 72142,55 71987,54 77439,39 73539,79 76299,45 77622,83 68191,87 70027,05 
Slovenia 45605,97 40752,85 38618,35 40455,05 36491,06 37279,71 38373,75 33567,32 34876,46 
Great-
Britain 2371421,87 1932676,80 1963487,03 2066259,88 2095715,90 2122767,68 2324364,13 2248791,31 2067885,81 
 
  
                                                          
17 The values shown are in millions of euros. 
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Annex 6. GDPPER CAPITA, at current prices18, in EU-28 and in Switzerland for 2008-2016 
Country  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 42,42 38,90 37,69 40,52 38,23 39,29 39,76 34,45 34,89 
Belgium 39,73 36,40 35,70 37,63 35,22 36,09 36,41 31,45 32,19 
Bulgaria 5,96 5,65 5,50 6,16 5,81 5,95 6,04 5,45 5,83 
Switzerland 59,47 56,72 60,01 69,74 65,77 65,94 66,59 63,92 62,30 
Cyprus 29,03 26,04 24,79 25,42 22,82 21,65 21,07 18,09 18,36 
Czech Republic 18,62 16,01 15,93 17,13 15,53 15,43 15,18 13,81 14,42 
Germany 37,49 33,85 33,61 36,92 34,69 36,05 36,94 32,20 32,94 
Denmark 52,77 47,18 46,68 48,71 46,06 47,41 48,10 41,31 41,80 
Estonia 14,84 11,94 11,77 13,77 13,72 14,78 15,34 13,37 13,84 
Greece 26,25 24,10 21,65 20,44 17,51 16,95 16,73 14,08 13,95 
Spain 29,19 26,23 24,72 25,11 22,49 22,63 22,78 20,10 20,76 
Finland 43,81 38,21 37,16 40,06 37,33 38,46 38,38 33,06 33,88 
France 37,19 33,72 32,69 34,54 32,18 33,00 33,07 28,53 28,76 
Croatia 13,04 11,48 10,89 11,49 10,43 10,58 10,46 9,16 9,59 
Hungary 12,91 10,57 10,53 11,14 10,15 10,59 10,92 9,73 10,00 
Ireland 50,26 42,26 39,15 41,16 38,61 40,11 42,61 48,17 50,00 
Italy 33,34 29,99 28,83 30,24 27,41 27,40 27,22 23,52 23,92 
Lithuania 12,27 9,60 9,64 11,32 11,29 12,16 12,72 11,14 11,63 
Luxembourg 93,77 83,70 84,43 91,31 84,04 88,03 91,68 79,06 78,58 
Latvia 13,41 9,91 9,11 10,81 10,88 11,65 12,08 10,63 10,98 
Malta 17,99 16,77 16,96 18,01 17,26 18,45 19,88 18,52 19,32 
Netherlands 46,70 42,10 40,49 42,23 38,95 39,96 40,11 34,87 35,60 
Poland 11,49 9,35 10,13 10,96 10,35 10,68 11,03 9,79 9,68 
Portugal 20,36 18,71 18,13 18,30 16,20 16,75 16,98 15,00 15,50 
Romania 8,53 6,87 6,62 7,22 6,74 7,43 7,70 7,00 7,44 
Sweden 45,73 37,48 41,89 47,00 44,98 46,71 45,51 39,60 40,44 
Slovak 
Republic 
15,30 13,39 13,35 14,34 13,60 14,09 14,33 12,57 12,89 
Slovenia 22,56 19,98 18,85 19,71 17,74 18,10 18,61 16,27 16,89 
Great-Britain 38,37 31,03 31,28 32,66 32,90 33,10 35,97 34,53 31,52 
 
  
                                                          
18 The values shown are in thousands of euros. 
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